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Abstract
We use simulations to study how the diversiﬁcation of electricity generation portfolios inﬂuences wholesale
prices. We ﬁnd that the relationship between technological diversiﬁcation and market prices is mediated by
the supply to demand ratio. In each demand case there is a threshold where pivotal dynamics change. Pivotal
dynamics pre- and post-threshold are the cause of non-linearities in the inﬂuence of diversiﬁcation on market
prices. The ﬁndings are robust to changes in the main market assumptions.
Keywords: Electricity, market power, simulations, technology diversiﬁcation.
1 Introduction
Electricity is a non-storable, undiﬀerentiated commodity, delivered into a market with low demand elasticity, high
security of supply requirements and wide seasonal variations. As a result, the industry accommodates a wide
range of generating technologies. Some generators are technologically diversiﬁed and own nuclear plants on the
base-load as well as higher cost thermal units. For example PG&E, a large US utility, owns hydro, nuclear, thermal
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and renewable plants (PG&E Corporation, 2006). Others are specialists, focusing on only one technology. Until
recently, British Energy’s generation portfolio was formed exclusively by eight nuclear generating units (British
Energy, 2006).1
A market in which generators are specialised could exhibit more market power because the price-setting part
of the merit order is more concentrated. However, in electricity pools, specialised high-cost generators have less
incentives to exert market power because they lack base-load plants to reap the beneﬁts (Ausubel and Cramton,
2002). In contrast, diversiﬁed ﬁrms have incentives to use their high-cost plants to increase market prices and
thereby increase the proﬁt on the base-load, but may not have enough price-setting capacity to do so.
Our paper addresses the general questions of “what is the shape of the diversiﬁcation to prices relationship?” and
“what are its determinants?” Speciﬁcally, we consider diﬀerent markets where a generation duopoly own varying
amounts of base- and peak-load capacity that is bundled into low- and high- cost plants. In order to isolate the
portfolio eﬀects, we keep market concentration as well as market base-load and high-cost capacities constant.
The trading environment is a multi-unit, compulsory, uniform-price auction. Despite being close to real spot
markets, this model is characterised by multiple non-Pareto ranked Nash equilibria (von der Fehr and Harbord,
1993), as in the "battle of the sexes" game. However, we inspect the equilibrium payoﬀs, identify crucial diﬀerences
across equilibria and are able to draw predictions about the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation on prices for each demand
level.
The main prediction is that changes in the number of “pivotal” plants will cause nonlinearities. Informally, a
high-cost plant is pivotal if the quantity demanded exceeds the sum of production capacities of all other plants and,
as a result, the plant is necessary to fulﬁll demand. In our setup, there is one, and only one, pivotal plant under
little or no diversiﬁcation. After a threshold, the number of pivotal plants changes. In low-demand situations, we
predict that the change will result in further competitive pressures. In high-demand cases, the change should lead
to more trading coordination and higher prices. To test the hypotheses, we use a simulation method based on the
adaptive theory of reinforcement learning put forward by Roth and Erev (1995).
We ﬁnd support for the non-monotonic diversiﬁcation to market prices relationship. For each demand to supply
ratio, we identify a diversiﬁcation breaking point where dynamics change. In low-demand situations, prices drop
after the breaking point, whereas in high-demand cases further diversiﬁcation leads to higher prices. We show
that the non-monotonicity is caused by regime changes in the ﬁrms’ incentives and ability to exert market power.
The estimated breaking points are shown to statistically match the theoretical thresholds at which the number of
pivotal plants changes. The ﬁndings are robust to a series of alternative modelling speciﬁcations, including single
price and supply function peak-load bidding as well as inelastic and elastic demands.
Despite its importance, the literature on generation portfolios as a source of market power is relatively sparse.
Borenstein et al. (1999) carry out Cournot numerical simulations to highlight the weaknesses of market power
concentration measures and also analyse the impact of several divestitures on market power in California. Bushnell
1British Energy has recently acquired one coal-ﬁred plant.
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(2003) analyses competition among several ﬁrms owning a mixture of hydroelectric and thermal generation resources
and concludes that ﬁrms may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to allocate more hydro production to oﬀ-peak periods than they
would if they did not act strategically. In a related paper, Garcia et al. (2005) analyse the price-formation process
in an inﬁnite-horizon model where hydroelectric generators engage in dynamic price-based competition and show
how simulations with a basic learning algorithm converge to the Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Crawford et al.
(2006) characterise the generators’ asymmetric behaviour in equilibrium and analyse the consequences of some
divestitures in England and Wales. Arellano and Serra (2007) show how, in cases where a regulator uses peak-
load marginal costs to determine wholesale prices, generators can exercise market power by increasing the share
of peak technology in their portfolio. Perhaps the closest paper to ours is by Bunn and Oliveira (2007), who use
simulation to model the interaction between an electricity market and a plant swapping game. They identify a
symbiotic interaction between the two markets: initial situations where ﬁrms are perfectly diversiﬁed evolve, via
plant trading, into lower electricity prices than those in which ﬁrms were originally specialised. To the best of our
knowledge, though, ours is the ﬁrst paper that studies explicitly the diversiﬁcation to prices relationship.
More attention has been devoted to quantifying the impact of marginal costs on prices and estimating the
generators’ ability to exert market power.2 Rudkevich et al. (1998), for example, characterise the pricing behaviour
of identical ﬁrms and show that prices increase with the system’s production cost curve. Wolfram (1995) quantiﬁes
generators’ markups in the England and Wales pool by using fuel cost estimates to compute the individual short-
run marginal cost functions. In a follow-up paper, Wolfram (1998) ﬁnds that generators with more inframarginal
capacity submitted higher bids for units with comparable costs. Borenstein et al. (2002) and Joskow and Kahn
(2002) decompose the dramatic California price and expenditure increases in the late Nineties and early 2000’s into
rising production costs, scarcity rents and ability to exercise of market power. Borenstein et al. (2002) ﬁnd that 21%
of the increased electricity expenditure is due to increased production costs, 20% is due to increased competitive
rents, and the remaining 59% is attributable to increased market power. Finally, market power not only increases
prices but also creates productive ineﬃciencies as more expensive generation substitutes less expensive production
(Wolak and Patrick, 1997).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the main approaches that have been
used to model electricity markets. Section 3 includes the model and an outline of our theoretical predictions. In
Section 4 we introduce the simulation procedure. The main statistical results and robustness checks are presented
in Sections 5 and 6. We conclude with a short discussion in Section 7. All theoretical proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Modelling competition in spot markets
There is some controversy about which model best ﬁts competition in spot electricity markets (see Newbery, 1997,
von der Fehr and Harbord, 1998, and Borenstein et al., 1999). Borenstein et al. (1999) argue that the Cournot model
2Beyond the unilateral eﬀects, Fabra and Toro (2005) and Puller (2007) analyse collusive attemps to exercise market power in a
dynamic context and Mansur (2007) shows that vertical integration might mitigate market power.
3
is an appropriate starting point since generating plants can be rendered “unavailable” due to maintenance and other
reliability considerations. Other strategic models, like standard Bertrand or Bertrand with capacity constraints,
are unsuitable due to the use of uniform pricing in power pools. Thus, the electricity literature has suggested two
main alternative approaches (von der Fehr and Harbord, 1998). One of them is the “auction approach”, suggested
by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) — vdF-H — and the other is Green and Newbery’s (1992) adaptation of the
“supply function” equilibrium (SFE) due to Klemperer and Meyer (1989).
In the auction approach, the market is modelled as a sealed-bid, multiple-unit auction. Generators simultane-
ously submit single prices at which they are willing to supply each generating set. Bids are ranked according to
their oﬀer prices and the system marginal price is determined by the intersection of demand and supply. VdF-H
show that for some demand levels there are no pure strategy equilibria and for others there are multiple equilibria
(see also Crawford et al. 2006).
One key restriction of most vdF-H implementations (e.g. Nicolaisen et al., 2001; Rupérez Micola and Bunn,
2008, and Rupérez Micola et al., 2008) is that ﬁrms are allowed only a single bid price per plant. Inherent
inﬂexibilities in the operation of nuclear plants (e.g. safety concerns, very low marginal costs and high start-up
and loss of volume costs) prompt them to submit ﬂat schedules at very low prices. This restriction, however, is
quite unrealistic to model peak-load thermal plants, which typically bid several steps per unit.3 At the market
level this leads to the well-known “hockey stick” shape of the supply curve, with base-load plants submitting ﬂat
bid schedules and more expensive peak-load generators oﬀering steeper supply functions.
The SFE approach complements the vdF-H approach with a model in which each ﬁrm chooses a supply function
relating quantity to price. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show that the steeper the equilibrium supply functions,
the more closely competition resembles the Cournot model; with ﬂatter equilibrium supply functions, competition
is closer to marginal cost pricing. Green and Newbery (1992) show that the Nash equilibrium in supply functions
implies a high mark-up on marginal cost and substantial deadweight losses in the early Nineties England and Wales
market.
The SFE model is not without its limitations, either. If the range of variation in demand is ﬁnite then it
appears to have little predictive value, since almost anything between the Cournot and the competitive solution
can be supported in equilibrium (see Bolle 1992). Hence, the literature oﬀers reﬁnements as a way of singling out a
unique supply function equilibrium. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show there is a unique SFE when inﬁnite demand
occurs with positive probability. Green and Newbery (1992) focus on the highest proﬁt equilibrium, rather than
including other equilibrium possibilities. Alternatively, Baldick and Hogan (2002) choose a unique equilibrium by
ruling out unstable equilibria and adding a price cap and capacity constraints. Newbery (1991) obtains a unique
SFE by considering entry and assuming bid-coordination. More recently, Holmberg (2007, 2008) shows that a
unique SFE exists if there are binding capacity constraints with a positive probability. Further, the solution is
undeﬁned if there is no short-run demand elasticity (von der Fehr and Harbord, 1998). Another diﬃculty with this
3Fabra et al. (2006) show that the vdF-H equilibria do not depend on the number of price steps submitted.
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approach is the assumption that generators submit continuously diﬀerentiable supply functions. A recent exception
is Holmberg (2007), who allows for horizontal segments in a supply function context, but shows that these segments
are not consistent with equilibrium behaviour. Restricting strategy sets to discrete step functions has the merit of
being more realistic.
In summary, although the auction and the supply function approaches seem to correspond better with real spot
markets, both of them exhibit multiple equilibria. As an alternative, some papers have used the Cournot model
(e.g. Bushnell, 2003, and Borenstein et al., 1999). In this paper, we explore a diﬀerent route. We draw from both
the auction and the supply function models and try to obtain results in the multiple equilibrium environment. We
use the auction approach in the main part of the paper and leave the supply function approach for the extensions.
3 Basic model
3.1 Market structure
Our model incorporates key features of electricity markets in the short run. Two companies compete to supply the
market with a mix of low (e.g. nuclear) and high (e.g. thermal) marginal cost capacity.4 Denoting the generating
companies as 1 and 2 and the overall market capacity as K, the capacities of their respective low (l) and high (h)
cost plants are
kl1 = kh2 =
(1− α)K
2
and kh1 = kl2 =
αK
2
,
where α ∈]0, 0.5[ represents the degree of portfolio diversiﬁcation. In the case of specialization (α = 0), company
1 is a low-cost specialist and company 2 is specialised in high-cost technology. Portfolio diversiﬁcation increases
with α, a growing proportion of the base-load generator’s capacity is exogenously replaced with high-cost units.
Symmetrically, the generator’s high-cost capacity is replaced with base-load. In the case of full diversiﬁcation
(α = 0.5), each company holds the same amount of low- and high-cost generating capacity. This formulation
isolates the eﬀects of portfolio diversiﬁcation because it allows diﬀerent diversiﬁcation degrees but keeps constant
both the total capacity of each company (kli + khi = K/2 for i = 1, 2) and the market aggregates of low- and
high-cost capacities (kj1 + kj2 = K/2 for j = l, h).
The main marginal cost component are the fuel costs (e.g. enriched uranium, natural gas), which we assume to
be constant. We normalise them to 0 for the low-cost plants (cl = 0) and make them equal to c for the high-cost
plants (ch = c > 0). In the robustness section, we study the case with strictly positive marginal costs for all units.
We also assume that there are no grid constraints.5 Although relevant in the long term, we do not deal with entry
4The model could easily be extended to other more realistic market conﬁgurations, including all sorts of oligopolies and the existence
of a competitive fringe. However, our analysis in a stylised market is more transparent and comparable to previous literature.
5The addition of network constraints would undoubtedly make the analysis richer but it would also make it more complicated to
dissentangle eﬀects due exclusively to technology diversiﬁcation from those arising from local market power exerted by relatively small
players.
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and exit of ﬁrms, capacity expansion, the use of long-term contracts (as in e.g. Baldick et al., 2006), ancillary and
capacity payments.
3.2 Market rules
Trading takes place through a multi-unit, compulsory, uniform-price auction. In the basic model, ﬁrms submit
simultaneous single-price bids at which they are willing to sell up to the capacity of each plant. In the robustness
section, we relax this assumption and allow for supply function bidding. Possible bids are bounded between marginal
costs and Ψ, a “reasonable” price cap. This upper price cap can be understood as a limit triggering regulatory
intervention or the cost of alternative, expensive, load fuels to which the system administrator could switch at
short notice if prices exceed Ψ. It might also reﬂect the cost of back-up power generation facilities owned by many
industrial users.
Short-term electricity demand is typically quite low (see e.g. Stoft, 2002) and we begin by modeling it as fully
inelastic. In the robustness section we allow for short-term demand elasticity. We assume that the inelastic demand,
Q¯, is certain, but the presence of a small degree of uncertainty would not alter our ﬁndings. We also assume that
there is some system overcapacity, Q¯ < K, but that demand exceeds the market aggregate of low-cost capacity,
Q¯ > K/2, consistent with the normal operations of many deregulated energy markets. For example, the UK energy
system includes a reserve margin of about 20% of expected peak demand.
An independent auctioneer determines the uniform market price P by intersecting the ad hoc supply function
with the demand. She assigns full capacity, qji = k
j
i , to the M plants with bids below the market price; the
remaining capacity, qji = Q¯ −
P
{i,j}∈M k
j
i , to the plant(s) with a bid equal to the market price and zero sales,
qji = 0, to those bidding above the market price. In case of a tie, the selling plant is selected randomly. Proﬁts for
each company are
πi = P qli + [P − c] qhi for i = 1, 2. (1)
3.3 Nash equilibria and predictions
In this subsection we compute the equilibria of the model. These depend crucially on the number of “pivotal”
plants (see e.g. Genc and Reynolds, 2005; Entriken and Wan, 2005; Perekhodtsev et al., 2002).
Deﬁnition 1 A plant is pivotal if (i) it is high-cost and (ii) if the quantity demanded exceeds the sum of production
capacities of all other plants.
Deﬁnition 2 A level of diversiﬁcation αυ is a switching point if the number of pivotal plants for α < αυ is diﬀerent
than that for α ≥ αυ.
For exampe, if Q¯ = 240 and K = 300, the switching point is αυ = 0.40 because the number of pivotal
plants changes from one to two at this level. If α < 0.40, the peak-load plant of Firm 2 is the only pivotal since
kl1 + kl2 + kh1 < 240 and kl1 + kl2 + kh2 > 240, whereas if α > 0.40 both peak-load plants are pivotal because
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kl1 + kl2 + kh1 < 240 and kl1 + kl2 + kh2 < 240. If Q¯ = 180 (and K = 300), the number of pivotal plants is reduced
from one to none at a switching point αυ = 0.13.
The level of excess capacity generates two pivotal switching regimes:
Proposition 3 For any Q¯
(a) if K/2 < Q¯ ≤ 3K/4, the switching point is α0υ(Q¯) ≡ (2Q¯ − K)/K, at which the number of pivotal plants is
reduced from one to none.
(b) if 3K/4 < Q¯ ≤ K, the switching point is α00υ(Q¯) ≡ 2(K − Q¯)/K, at which the number of pivotal plants is
increased from one to two.
For each demand level, there is a switching point where the number of pivotal plants changes. There is always
one pivotal plant when diversiﬁcation is low. In contrast, there are no pivotal plants in relative spare capacity cases
(i.e. α > α0υ when Q¯ ≤ 3K/4), and two if capacity is tight (i.e. for α > α00υ when Q¯ > 3K/4). Table 1 summarises
the pivotal switching points for ten-unit step demand levels when K = 300, together with the capacities of each
plant and the number of pivotal plants before and after the thresholds.
<<TABLE 1: PIVOTAL SWITCHING POINTS FOR EACH DEMAND LEVEL>>
Our trading setting often presents multiple non-Pareto-ranked equilibria (von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993;
Crawford et al., 2006). Denoting the equilibrium bids of each ﬁrm as (bl1, bl2, bh1 , bh2), the following proposition
characterizes the pure strategy Nash equilibria and shows how they depend on the pivotal dynamics.
Proposition 4 There exist α1(Q¯) and α2(Q¯) such that
(a) if no plant is pivotal (α0υ < α ≤ 0.5), then
bl1 = Ψ− ε, bh1 = Ψ is part of an equilibrium if α ≥ α1,
bl2 = Ψ− ε, bh2 = Ψ is part of an equilibrium if α ≤ α2 and
bh1 = bh2 = c is part of an equilibrium if α > α2,
(b) if only one high-cost plant is pivotal (α ≤ min{α0υ, α00υ}), then
bl1 = Ψ− ε, bh1 = Ψ is part of an equilibrium if α ≥ α1 and
bh2 = Ψ is part of an equilibrium for any α,
(c) if both high-cost plants are pivotal (α00υ < α ≤ 0.5), then
bh1 = Ψ is part of an equilibrium for any α and
bh2 = Ψ is part of an equilibrium for any α.
For any class of equilibrium, there are many payoﬀ-equivalent, lower bids of the other plants which are part of a
pure strategy equilibria. Furthermore, there are many mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
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Figure 1 depicts the number of pivotal plants and the (pure-strategy) equilibria for diﬀerent demand and
diversiﬁcation levels when K = 300. The number of pivotal plants is determined by a centered inverted V-shape
curve. Below the curve (areas b.1 and b.2), there is one pivotal plant. In the northwest area (areas a.1, a.2 and
a.3), no plant is pivotal. In the northeast (area c), the two high-cost plants are pivotal. Within the area in which
no plant is pivotal, the ﬁrst equilibrium is possible in area (a.1), the second in areas (a.1) and (a.2), and the third
in area (a.3). Within the area in which one ﬁrm is pivotal, the ﬁrst equilibrium exists in area (b.1) and the second
one exists in areas (b.1) and (b.2). Finally, we ﬁnd both equilibria of part (c) in the whole of area (c).
<<FIGURE 1: NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR EACH α AND Q¯ WHEN K = 300>>
Proposition 4 shows that multiple non-Pareto-ranked pure-strategy equilibria are widespread. For most para-
meter values, one of the ﬁrms keeps prices high while the other submits lower bids and sells its full capacity at the
maximum price. As a result, one of the ﬁrms obtains a relatively low proﬁt whereas the other gets its maximum
proﬁt. Our model is similar to the “battle of the sexes”, a standard coordination game with two pure strategy
equilibria with asymmetric payoﬀs. Experimental evidence shows that coordination, even in simple cases, can be
lower than 50% in this game (Cooper et al., 1990). Coordination is especially diﬃcult when there are equilibrium
payoﬀ asymmetries because the point of coordination is not clear (Crawford et al., 2008).6 In our setting, ﬁrms
will have problems coordinating over who is price-setting, and this will be more diﬃcult the higher the equilibrium
proﬁt asymmetry. More asymmetry will reduce the ﬁrms’ incentives to be price-setter and induce them to submit
lower bids.
This allows us to draw some predictions about the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation on prices for each demand level.7
Prices should decrease when the number of pivotal plants moves from one to zero. First, with no pivotal plants,
there is an equilibrium in which prices are equal to marginal costs, while the equilibrium price is always equal to
the maximum in the one-pivotal cases. Second, the equilibria are highly asymmetric when there are no pivotal
plants because one ﬁrm uses both plants to set the price and obtains an extremely low proﬁt while the other gets
its maximum. In a one-pivotal plant equilibria, though, the price-setting ﬁrm sells at least its full low-cost capacity
and proﬁts are more symmetric. Hence, prices should decrease when the number of pivotal plants moves from one
to zero, i.e. in low-demand cases.
Hypothesis 1 The dynamics pre- and post-switching point result in nonlinearities in the inﬂuence of diversiﬁcation
on market prices. A breaking point occurs at the switching point, where the number of pivotal plants changes.
Hypothesis 2 In spare capacity cases, prices drop at the breaking point.
6The only symmetric equilibrium, in which identical players choose the same action and obtain an equal expected payoﬀ, is the
mixed strategy equilibrium, but each player prefers his worst pure-strategy equilibrium to the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium
(Iriberri, 2006).
7Absolute prices are not comparable for diﬀerent demand levels because the demand also aﬀects the potential margins. In any case,
for most of the parameter regions of the proposition, the equilibrium price is the maximum price.
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Similarly, we would expect higher prices as the number of pivotal plants increases from one to two (high demand
cases). Coordination problems should be less severe in this case since, in the two equilibria, the price-setting ﬁrm
only uses the peak load plant to set the price and proﬁts are more symmetric. In contrast, when there is only one
pivotal plant, there is an equilibrium in which the price-setting ﬁrm uses both plants.
Hypothesis 3 When capacity is tight, prices increase at the breaking point.
Although the three regions in Figure 1 can be divided further into subregions, we do not expect the diversiﬁcation
to prices relationship to present other breaking points. The presence of other equilibria, in which the price-setting
ﬁrm obtains very low proﬁts, should be less important. Still, as a robustness check, we will test the existence of a
second breaking point.
Our setting also presents many mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Take the case where α = 0.5 and Q¯ > 3K/4,
in which the ﬁrms are perfectly diversiﬁed and symmetric, and their high-cost plants are pivotal. As shown in
the proof of Proposition 4, both low-cost plants bidding below c and both high-cost plants choosing a particular
probability distribution over all the possible bids constitutes a class of (symmetric) mixed strategy equilibria.
This class of equilibria has two interesting properties. The probability densities of the high-cost plants are
increasing, i.e. less competitive bids have higher probability. Further, the probabilities given to the highest bids
are higher as demand increases, and those given to the lowest bids are lower. The probability to play a high bid
grows with the market demand.
Although the ﬁrms’ behaviour might exhibit some of these properties, we do not expect them to play a mixed
strategy equilibrium. In a mixed strategy equilibrium players are completely indiﬀerent among the actions selected
with positive probability. They choose the particular mixed strategy only to make other players indiﬀerent among
their own actions.
4 Simulation Procedure
4.1 Behavioural learning
In equilibrium multiplicity cases, a selection method is necessary to choose amongst them. In broad terms, there
are two schools of thought in the area of equilibrium selection (Haruvy and Stahl, 2004). On the one hand,
we have deductive selection – based on reasoning and coordination in focal points – and, on the other hand,
we have inductive selection – based on adaptive dynamics. Until recently, deductive principles have dominated
the equilibrium selection literature. Existing deductive mechanisms, however, have been shown to do poorly in
experiments (see e.g. van Huyck et al., 1990). Simple adaptive learning dynamics, instead, often yield successful
equilibrium predictions (see e.g. Camerer and Ho, 1999, and Roth and Erev, 1995).
Reinforcement models are widely used adaptive learning mechanisms (see e.g. Erev and Haruvy, 2001, Sandholm,
2002, and Hopkins, 2008), especially in energy markets (Nicolaisen et al., 2001, Veit et al., 2006, Sun and Tesfatsion,
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2007, Rupérez Micola and Bunn, 2008, Rupérez Micola et al., 2008). They are based on the law of eﬀect, whereby
actions that result in more positive consequences are more likely to be repeated in the future, and on the law of
practice, whereby learning curves tend to be steep initially and then ﬂatter.
We adopt the well-known reinforcement learning method put forward by Roth and Erev (1995) — R-E. This
method has some advantages. Since it is widely used and more parsimonious than other algorithms, our results
are more easily comparable to the preceeding literature. Moreover, its principles ﬁt some features of energy market
trading well. It is based on the law of eﬀect and the law of practice, which are robust properties observed in
the literature on human learning. Other simulation algorithms are either completely naive (e.g. zero intelligence)
or diﬃcult to interpret in an energy market context (genetic algorithms, Q-learning). One of the main strengths
of the R-E method is that one does not need to make assumptions on the information that players have about
strategies, history of play and the payoﬀ structure of the other players. In many cases energy market players cannot
observe one another’s current strategies, and only imperfectly infer them from volatile prices. Algorithms like best
response, ﬁctitious play or experience-weighted attraction require agents to have an amount of information that we
ﬁnd diﬃcult to justify.
Models of reinforcement learning rule out dominated strategies and, in particular situations like constant-sum
games with a unique equilibrium, strategies converge to the Nash equilibrium (Beggs, 2005). Van Huyck et al.
(1997) show that, in a generic coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked-equilibria, the selected equilibrium
depends on historical accidents, rather than on deductive concepts of eﬃciency. In our more complex game with
multiple non-Pareto ranked equilibria, we also expect R-E to depend on the stochastic process. The convergence
to a unique steady state, pure or mixed strategy Nash equilibria, cannot be guaranteed in general (van Huyck et
al., 1997) but R-E stabilises at one point and action patterns emerge. Thus, we proceed in two steps. First, we
perform many simulations for each combination of parameters. Then, we use statistics to determine whether the
stochastic regularities are systematic and, if so, how they depend on the parameters.
4.2 Implementation
In our implementation, learning takes place by repeating the following three steps in each period.
Step 1 Generators submit price oﬀers for each plant according to a plant-speciﬁc probability distribution over the
set of possible bids.
In the main simulation, the feasible price oﬀer domain for each plant is approximated by a discrete grid. For
each plant, generators choose among S possible prices, equally spaced between the minimum and the maximum
price oﬀer. That is, the sets of possible bids for the low- and high-cost plants, Bl and Bh, range between 0 and c,8
8An alternative is to allow expensive plants to bid below c so that they have to ﬁnd out for themselves that this is not proﬁtable.
This slows the learning process down but does not alter our results. Thus, as most of the electricity simulation literature, we do not
allow ﬁrms to bid below marginal costs.
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respectively, up to Ψ,
Bl = {s (Ψ/S) | s = 1, ..., S } , (2)
Bh = {c+ s (Ψ− c) /S | s = 1, ..., S } . (3)
Each bid is generated by an “action s”. Bids generated from lower actions are more competitive, i.e. closer to
marginal costs. Notice though that the same action s implies a higher bid for a peak-load generator than for a
base-load generator.
In each round t, each generator i selects an action s for plant j with a likelihood or “propensity” rji,s(t) > 0.
The probability of an action being played is given by its propensity divided by the sum of the propensities of all
possible actions,
pji,s(t) =
rji,s(t)PS
u=1 r
j
i,u(t)
. (4)
Propensities for all actions are initialised to the plants’ maximum per-period proﬁt, i.e. rji,s(1) = Ψk
j
i , so that all
actions have the same initial probability, pji,s(1) = 1S for all s, i and j.
Step 2 The auctioneer determines the market price by intersecting the ad hoc supply function with the demand.
The price and the individual quantities are communicated independently to each generator.
Step 3 Each plant-speciﬁc probability distribution is adjusted based on the performance of the bid used.
At the end of each round, plants reinforce the selected action, s¯, through an increase in its propensity equivalent
to the performance of the company as a whole, πi(t). Actions that are similar, i.e. s¯− 1 and s¯+ 1, are reinforced
to a lesser extent, by (1− δ)πi(t) where 0 < δ < 1 (“persistent local experimentation” in the terminology of R-E).
All propensities are discounted by γ (“gradual forgetting”) and actions whose probability falls below a certain
threshold are removed from the space of choice (“extinction in ﬁnite time”). The pre-extinction propensities for
the following period rj0i,s(t+ 1) are
rj0i,s(t+ 1) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1− γ) rji,s(t) + πi(t) if s = s¯
(1− γ) rji,s(t) + (1− δ) πi(t) if s = s¯− 1 or s = s¯+ 1
(1− γ) rji,s(t) if s 6= s¯− 1, s 6= s¯ and s 6= s¯+ 1,
and the ﬁnal propensities, corrected by the extinction feature, are
rji,s(t+ 1) = r
j0
i,s(t+ 1)I{
rj0i,s(t+ 1)PS
u=1 r
j0
i,u(t+ 1)
> μ}, (5)
where I is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the condition between brackets is satisﬁed and is otherwise
zero.
Algorithm 1 Steps 1 to 3 are repeated until convergence has been achieved.
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Following the theoretical literature on learning (see Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, for an overview), we deﬁne
convergence in terms of strategy proﬁles. In our case, this is done using the empirical frequencies of each player’s
actions. In this sense, R-E is a particularly attractive algorithm because it is based on the "power law of practice"
psychological principle: learning curves tend to be steep initially, and then ﬂatter. By construction agents operating
under Roth-Erev learn fast in the beginning of the simulation but their learning slows down with increasing practice.
We consider that a simulation run has converged if the maximum attainable per-period change in the probability
of playing any strategy is below a (small) threshold τ .
Deﬁnition 5 For a given τ (small), a simulation run has converged to a mixed strategy proﬁle z at time t if for
any potential action proﬁle a in time t+1, the probability distribution adjustment of any action s of any plant j of
any generator i is such that ¯¯¯
pji,s(t+ 1)− pji,s(t)
¯¯¯
< τ.
The resulting price is computed from the agents’ mixed strategy proﬁle z.
We set an exogenous (small) τ .9 In each period, we identify the action with the lowest probability in a given
period and calculate the hypothetical probability (at t+1) that would result from that action leading to the highest
attainable proﬁt. The simulation has not converged as long as the diﬀerence between the hypothetical probability
(at t+ 1) and the true (at t) is higher than τ . It has converged when it is lower. When τ is smaller, the threshold
is more stringent and the simulation will run for more periods.
The resulting mean price is computed from the agents’ choice distributions. Similar results are obtained if we
take the average price obtained by letting the simulations run for an additional number of periods, beyond the
convergence point. Note that the convergence deﬁnition is compatible with the survival of several trading actions,
as in mixed strategies. Price volatility is not equal to zero even if there is convergence to a steady state. Further,
reinforcement learning depends on the stochastic process and, as a result, simulations for the same parameters
might lead to diﬀerent mean prices, i.e. the standard deviation of mean prices across simulations is not necessarily
equal to zero.
4.3 Parameters and data set
The price cap is set at Ψ = 200, with a discrete grid of S = 100 possible prices. Total capacity is set to K = 300,
so that each generator’s capacity is K/2 = 150. Marginal costs for the high-cost plants are c = 100 and equal to
zero for the low-cost plants. With these parameters, the ﬁrms’ maximum attainable proﬁts range between those for
a specialised base-load ﬁrm (30, 000 monetary units) and those for a specialised peak-load ﬁrm (15, 000 monetary
units), depending on the capacity conﬁguration. Firm 1’s maximum proﬁt decrease from 30, 000 when α = 0 to
22, 500 when α = 0.5 whereas Firm 2’s maximum proﬁt increase from 15, 000 when α = 0 to 22, 500 when α = 0.5.
The maximum industry proﬁts remain constant at 45, 000.
9As explained below, we set τ = 0.00025 in our parametrision, which implies that simulations run for between 500 and 2000 periods.
We have performed several robustness checks to the speciﬁcation of this parameter but they do not alter our results.
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We perform simulations for a discrete grid of fourteen demand cases, Q¯ = {160, 170..., 290}, corresponding to
excess capacity of 46.66% through 3.33%. For each instance, we consider ﬁfty-one diversiﬁcation levels, α = {0,
.01, .02, ..., .50}. Further, we check the robustness of the analysis to changes in R-E parameters by taking nine
combinations of the learning parameters, γ = {0.0025, 0.005, 0.0075} and δ = {0.25, 0.50, 0.75}, with μ = 0.0005
and τ = 0.00025 throughout. For each speciﬁcation, we perform ﬁfty simulation runs. To create our data set we
take, for each simulation run, α, Q¯, γ and δ, the expected price resulting from the agents’ choice distributions once
convergence has been achieved. Hence, our main data set includes 50× 51× 14× 3× 3 = 321, 300 observations.
As representative cases, we focus on the demand cases of Q¯ = {240, 180 and 280}, with excess capacities of
20%, 40% and 6.66%. In those examples, we approximate power systems under normal operations, spare and tight
capacity conditions.
5 Statistical results
We present our estimation results in several steps. We start by exploring the impact of diversiﬁcation on prices
and show with examples that the relationship is not linear. Then we use the theoretical predictions to explore the
nonlinearities. We test whether the data features breaking points in the locations predicted by the theory and use
an intuitive procedure to check whether the theoretically derived piecewise model is best ﬁtting. Then, we test via
a formal statistical model the existence of a breaking point at the theoretical location and discard the existence of
a second breaking point. Finally, we present some results on the impact of diversiﬁcation on the stationary bidding
strategies.
5.1 Linear diversiﬁcation/price relationship
Table 2 reports the results of a linear regression between α and stationary market prices, with Q¯ as a covariate,
and ﬁxed eﬀects for δ and γ. The results show a positive relationship between demand and prices as expected. The
diversiﬁcation estimate α is negative and strongly signiﬁcative. A naïve observer might be tempted to see this as
evidence of diversiﬁcation leading to lower prices. One of the main purposes of this paper, though, is to show that
nonlinearities are central.
<<TABLE 2: FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION RESULTS>>
Figures 2-4 report the mean price and its 95% conﬁdence interval as a function of portfolio diversiﬁcation (α)
for Q¯ = {240, 180 and 280}, with γ = 0.005 and δ = 0.50. In Figure 2 (Q¯ = 240), prices remain around 168
in the interval α ∈ (0, 0.40). At α = 0.40, prices increase to around 176 and stay there until α = 0.50. Figures
3 (Q¯ = 180) and 4 (Q¯ = 280) reinforce the view of demand, or its analogue “excess capacity”, mediating on the
inﬂuence of portfolio diversiﬁcation. In the spare capacity situation (Figure 3) prices are lower than in the baseline
case. The specialization price is 154.1. Further, the relationship between prices and diversiﬁcation is ﬂat until
about α = 0.19, where there is a discontinuity. Prices drop to 142 and stay low in spite of a slight upward trend.
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In the tight capacity situation (Figure 4), prices are slightly higher but they seem to follow a similar pattern to the
baseline case. They start at 173.7 and stay ﬂat until around α = 0.13, where there is an increase to about 179.1.
Beyond that point, they are ﬂat once again, albeit at the higher level.
<FIGURES 2, 3, 4: PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION AND MEAN PRICE FOR Q¯ = {240, 180 and 280}>
Taken together, Table 2 and Figures 2 to 4 provide interesting insights. Table 2 suggests that the shape of the
diversiﬁcation to prices relationship could be thought of as decreasing if one had only considered a linear model.
More careful analysis, though, reveals two further elements: First, the relationship is not monotonic and, second,
there is a signiﬁcant variation in its shape, depending on Q¯. Structural breaks seem to occur for α = 0.40 in the
Q¯ = 240, case, for α = 0.19 for Q¯ = 180 and α = 0.13 for Q¯ = 280. Note that they are visually close to the
respective pivotal switching points identiﬁed in the theory section. Finally, notice that prices move downwards
when we move from one to zero pivotal plants (Q¯ = 180) and upwards when the movement is from one to two
pivotal plants (Q¯ = 240 and Q¯ = 280).
5.2 Non-linear relationship and pivotal regime switching points
In this section, we carry out a test of whether the data set features pivotal regime switching points in the locations
predicted by the theory. To that purpose, we use the pivotal switching points from Table 1 and estimate a piecewise
linear model between diversiﬁcation and prices for each demand and R-E combination. The models are uniquely
speciﬁed by a dummy variable associated with the threshold value αv,
Pi = β0 + β1Di + β2αi + β3Diαi + ui, (6)
where Di = 0 if αi < αv, Di = 1 when αi ≥ αv. The pre- and post- breaking points regression estimates are
speciﬁed by
E(Pi|Di = 0, αi) = β0 + β2αi and E(Pi|Di = 1, αi) = (β0 + β1) + (β2 + β3)αi.
We test the null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of structural breaks at the pivotal switching
points αv. Evidence for the existence of a breaking point can come either from signiﬁcant intercept change or slope
change coeﬃcients, i.e. β1 and β3 diﬀerent from zero. Table 3 summarises the results obtained through Fama-
MacBeth-type (1973) regressions averaging across R-E treatments for each demand. In a ﬁrst step, a regression is
performed for each R-E treatment. In a second step, we take their average to obtain the ﬁnal estimates.
In all fourteen Q¯ cases at least one of the two coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant at standard levels. There are ﬁve non-
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients (one intercept, four slopes) but in all cases the other coeﬃcient is signiﬁcative at the .01
level. These results indicate that the data presents the regime switching points suggested by the theory. The tests
provide preliminary support for our hypotheses.
<<TABLE 3 PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR REGIME SWITCHING POINTS>>
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5.3 Testing the location of the breaking points
This section uses an intuitive procedure to test whether the theoretical piecewise model is best ﬁtting. The procedure
selects the “optimal” breaking point from the data and seeks to establish whether it is statistically equivalent to
the one obtained through theory. We start by providing a deﬁnition of an optimal breaking point.
Deﬁnition 6 The optimal breaking point bα satisﬁes F (bα) ≥ F (α) for any threshold α, where F (α) denotes the
F-statistic obtained from a piecewise linear regression with threshold α.
Figure 5 reports the optimal piecewise linear models for each demand. Each line corresponds to an R-E
parameter combination and each panel corresponds to a diﬀerent demand speciﬁcation. If 160 ≤ Q¯ ≤ 220 (low
demand) the thresholds result in price reductions of about 10 monetary units. When 230 ≤ Q¯ ≤ 290 (high demand),
the breaking points coincide with clear price jumps followed by ﬂat diversiﬁcation/prices relationships. The size of
the high demand jumps is approximately 6 monetary units. This piece of evidence supports Hypotheses 2 and 3.
Note that the R-E assumptions have little inﬂuence on price levels.
<<FIGURE 5: AVERAGE BEST-FIT REGRESSIONS FOR R-E COMBINATIONS AND Q¯>>
As an additional step, we compare the theoretical and estimated values with conﬁdence intervals. We approx-
imate the distribution of the structural breaks through a subsampling procedure.10 For each demand and R-E
assumptions, we extract 99 random subsamples of 1, 020 observations stratiﬁed for α (we use twenty observations
for each α). Then, we use Deﬁnition 6 to obtain the subsamples’ optimal breaking points.
In Figure 6, we combine mean (squares) and the 95% conﬁdence intervals of the optimal breaking points with
their corresponding theoretical values in Table 1 (diamonds). Each panel reports one R-E combination and, for each
of them, we report the simulated and theoretical breaking points (vertical axis) in each demand level (horizontal
axis). They co-move following an inverted V-shape. Intervals are very narrow, even indistinguishable, and visually
overlap with the theoretical predictions. The tests reject the hypothesis of equal theoretical and simulation-derived
pivotal switching points in only one instance out of 126 (table available upon request). Moreover, since the
theoretical prediction does not depend on the R-E parameters (it is the same across Figure 6 panels), these results
conﬁrm that the breaking point for each demand does not depend on the R-E speciﬁcation.
<<FIGURE 6: THEORETICAL AND ESTIMATED BREAKING POINTS FOR R-E COMBINATIONS AND Q¯>>
10One of the main complications in this type of models arises in the case when there are an unknown number of change points.
However, the problem is easier when (like in our case) there is prior theory suggesting the number of breaking points. In our case, one
or at most two change points is a sensible possibility. To test that our method does not lead to biases in the location of the breaking
points, we carry out tests to discard the existence of a second breaking point in the following subsection.
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5.4 Testing the number of breaking points
In this section, use the framework developed by Gombay et al. (1996) and extended by Orasch (1999) to formally
test the existence of the breaking point at the theoretical prediction and discard the existence of a second one.11
Following their notation, we redeﬁne the theoretical and estimated breaking points, kv and ek, as the integers
immediately below the change. The predicted pivotal points for Q¯ = 180, Q¯ = 240, and Q¯ = 280 are 19, 39 and
12, respectively.
Gombay et al. (1996) show that the statistic ek, deﬁned as
ek ≡ argmax
k
M(k) where M(k) ≡ n−3/2k(n− k)
½
1
k
P
1≤i≤k bui2 − 1n− k Pk+1<i≤n bui2
¾
,
where bui are the estimated residuals from a linear regression and n is the number of observations, can be used to
detect the location of an unknown breaking point. The statistic M(ek) can be used to test the null hypothesis of
no breaking point. Orasch (1999) shows that this can be extended to test for the existence and detect the location
of at most two breaking points, located in
(ek1,ek2) ≡ arg maxk1≤k2N(k1, k2)where N(k1, k2) ≡ [(n− k1)M(k2) + k2M(k1)] /n.
The statistic N(ek1,ek2) can be used to test the null hypothesis of no breaking point.
We run the test for the average prices when Q¯ = 180, Q¯ = 240, and Q¯ = 280, with γ = 0.005 and δ = 0.50.
Orasch’s (1999) estimator rejects the null hypothesis of the non-existence of any breaking point versus at-most-two
breaking points. The statistic N(ek1,ek2) is equal to 1.72, 2.013 and 1.94, respectively, and the critical value is 1.54.
The estimated breaking points (ek1,ek2) are (19, 20), (41, 42) and (1, 14). As we can see, they are all very close to our
predicted pivotal values, 19, 39 and 12. The only exception is ek1 in the last case. However, change point statistics
exhibit poor sensitivity to deviations that may occur in the tails (Mason and Schuenemeyer, 1983), and ek2 is the
meaningful change point in practice.
We are now going to show (1) that ek1 is statistically equal to ek2 in the ﬁrst two cases and therefore there is only
one breaking point, and (2) that that they are all statistically equal to the predicted theoretical value. Suppose
that this is true. Then, ek1 is equal to the estimator of the at-most-one breaking point case, bk (Orasch, 1999).
Gombay et al. (1995) shows that the asymptotic distribution of
δ2
γ2 (
bk − kv),
where γ is the fourth moment of ui and δ is an arbitrarily chosen function such that δ(n) → 0 as n → ∞, has a
density function equal to
f(t) =
½h(−t, 1− kv/n, kv/n) if t ≤ 0
h(−t, kv/n, 1− kv/n) if t > 0
11Gombay et al. (1996) have developed a test to detect a possible change in the variance of independent observations, a framework
which has been extended by Orasch (1999) to detect multiple changes. The tabulation of the asymptotic distributions can be found in
Orasch and Pouliot (2004). Pouliot (2008) brings it to a linear regression context.
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where
h(t, x, y) = 2x(x+ 2y){1−Φ((x+ 2y)t1/2) exp(2y(x+ y)t)− 2x2(1−Φ(xt1/2)}.
We can now derive the conﬁdence intervals for the three ek1 with δ(n) = d/√n for a given constant d > 0. For
d = 200, d = 50 and d = 100, the 95% conﬁdence intervals are (14.82, 20.19), (38.96, 51.18) and (11.45, 14.19),
respectively.12 Even for a large constant d (i.e. a small interval), the theoretical and estimated values for the
second breaking point fall within the intervals.
To summarise, the statistical examination supports the theoretical hypotheses: (1) the dynamics pre- and post-
breaking point result in nonlinearities in the inﬂuence of diversiﬁcation on market prices, (2) a breaking point
occurs at the switching point, when the number of pivotal plants changes, (3) in spare capacity cases prices drop
at the breaking point and (4) when capacity is tight, prices increase at the breaking point.
5.5 Diversiﬁcation and latent intensity of competition
In a simulation environment, it is possible to inspect the probability priors from which bids are chosen (see also
Rupérez Micola and Bunn, 2008, and Rupérez Micola et al., 2008). It is therefore possible to study how market
structures (excess demand, generation diversiﬁcation, etc.) inﬂuence the ﬁrms’ “competitive attitude” and not only
market outcomes. Through their trading interaction and the R-E algorithm, ﬁrms learn to prioritise those bidding
strategies that achieve higher payoﬀs and choose them more often. Price regularities follow once marginal supply
patterns are established.
The panels in Figure 7 depict the end-of-simulation individual latent probability distributions from which ﬁrms
choose bids. Figure 7 summarises the probabilities under Q¯ = 180, and Q¯ = 280 for specialisation (α = 0),
diversiﬁcation (α = 0.5) and at the breaking points (αv = 0.20 and αv = 0.13, respectively), averaged across the
50 simulation runs for δ = 0.5 and γ = 0.005. On the horizontal axes, actions are identiﬁed with numbers ranging
from 1, for the more competitive, to 100, for the highest possible bid. Cumulative probabilities are calculated on
the vertical axes for each element of the action space.
From its deﬁnition we know that the probabilities’ concentration is largely invariant beyond the convergence
point, so that its distributions are a good approximation to the plants’ long-term mixed strategies. Probabilities
concentrated on higher actions result in the plants bidding less competitively, and viceversa. Curve movements to
the upper-left and lower-right corners suggest that the market becomes more and less competitive, respectively.
More linear distributions do not mean that there has been no learning, only that agents have learnt that they are
better oﬀ with a mixed strategy in which all actions have similar probabilities.
<<FIGURE 7: LATENT INTENSITIES OF COMPETITION>>
Figure 7 oﬀers a number of general insights. Peak-load plants’ distributions stochastically dominate the base-
load distributions, which means that peak-load bids are less competitive than those from base-load plants. This
12As usual, the intervals are given by [hk1 − z+i γ2/(d/
√n)2,hk1 − z−i γ2/(d/
√n)2] where, in the ﬁrst case, z−i = −6, z+i = 21,
γ2 = 155.96, n = 51,hk1 = 19 and d = 200.
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will translate into even higher expected bids since the same action s implies a higher bid for a peak-load generator
than for a base-load generator. Notice that unless the probabilities of playing a high action with the low-capacity
plant and a low action with the high-capacity plant are reduced to zero, there will be some instances in which an
agent might bid higher with the low-cost plant. This will occur rarely, though. Under α = 0, bids are lower for
the base-load specialist. However, when α = 0.50, bidding priors are very similar for each plant type but diﬀerent
across types. Thus, there is a clear identiﬁcation between generation technology and the competitiveness of the
plant’s trading prior.
Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence of a link between portfolio diversiﬁcation, learning, trading behaviour and market
outcomes. For a given α, a demand increase from Q¯ = 180 to Q¯ = 280 makes the bids less competitive (i.e.
lower-right movements). Trading priors shift in the competitive direction (upper left) when diversiﬁcation grows
from α = 0 to αv with resulting lower bids and, hence, lower market prices. When the movement is from αv to
α = 0.5, though, the curves move to the lower-right corner, which suggests a less competitive attitude and higher
prices. The latent intensity of competition ﬁgures provide support for the theoretical mechanisms underpinning
the hypotheses.
6 Robustness
In this section we carry out robustness checks against an alternative supply function bidding procedure, as well as
cases in which the marginal costs of the low-cost plants are positive and in which there is some short-term demand
elasticity.
6.1 Supply function bidding
One restriction of our vdF-H implementation is that ﬁrms are only allowed to submit a single-price bid per plant.
This might be a reasonable approximation in the case of nuclear power. Inherent inﬂexibilities in the operation of
such plants (e.g. safety concerns, very low marginal costs and high start-up and loss of volume costs) prompt them
to submit ﬂat schedules. However, the restriction is quite unrealistic when modelling high-cost units such as thermal
plants that typically use several steps. In this section, we check the robustness of our results to an alternative model
in which ﬁrms submit single-price bids for their base-load capacity and bid with increasing supply functions for
their peak-load. A supply schedule speciﬁes the price at which a given quantity will be oﬀered. This model takes
into account how technological diversiﬁcation aﬀects the “expressivity” of bid functions. By expressivity we mean
the ﬁrm’s technological ﬂexibility to submit supply schedules with varying slopes.13
The only changes with respect to the vdF-H implementation relate to the deﬁnition of supply function schedules
and market clearing. In the supply function implementation, generators submit increasing supply schedules for
their peak-load plant. The set of possible supply schedules corresponds to a set of capped linearly increasing curves
13We thank the Associate Editor for providing us with this term.
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starting from the marginal cost. Their angles, s = 1, ..., S, are equally spaced between the minimum (zero degrees)
and the maximum (ninety degrees or π/2 radians). The resulting linear curves are capped at Ψ. The schedule is
linear when the full individual capacity is oﬀered at a price below Ψ, and linearly increasing up to the intersection
with Ψ and then ﬂat when some of it is oﬀered at a price above Ψ.
Formally, the set of supply schedules is given by
Sh(q) =
½
min(c+ (b
h(s)− c)
khi
q,Ψ) | s = 1, ..., S
¾
,
where
bh(s) = c+ sin(s (π/2) /S)
cos(s (π/2) /S) k
h
i .
That is, the set of supply schedules is the set of linear curves from the coordinates (0, c) until (khi , bh(s)), capped
at Ψ. The angle of the plant’s supply schedule, s, is the “action” and therefore the variable to reinforce. Higher
actions represent schedules with steeper slopes, rotating around the marginal cost point. Schedules generated
from lower actions are more competitive, i.e. ﬂatter. Base-load plants bid ﬂat schedules as in the basic model
(Bl = {s (Ψ/S) | s = 1, ..., S }).
The left panel in Figure 8 shows a hypothetical bidding example with four equally sized plants. The pink and
red curves represent the supply schedules of the high-cost plants. The pink schedule is linear but the red schedule
presents a kink at the point where it meets Ψ. The dotted lines represent other possible supply schedules of the
high-cost generating units. The blue and green lines are the two low-cost bids.
<<FIGURE 8: SUPPLY FUNCTION BIDDING>>
We build the market supply schedule by horizontally adding up the individual curves. In the example, the
aggregated supply is the black solid line (right hand side panel). An independent auctioneer determines the price
P by intersecting the market supply function with the demand (Q = 245 in the example). She assigns full capacity
to the schedules below the market price. Those crossing the market price receive the quantities they are willing to
sell at that price. The parts of the supply schedules above the market price receive nothing.
The classes of pure-strategy Nash equilibria identiﬁed in Proposition 4 are also equilibria here. The supply
function model includes, as extreme cases, the ﬂat individual bids at the marginal cost (ﬂattest angle) and at the
maximum price (steepest angle). Therefore, price-setting (high- or low-cost) plants can submit ﬂat bids at Ψ = 200.
The remaining plants can submit ﬂat bids at marginal cost. Those bids constitute an equilibrium as in the vdF-H´s
implementation. This result is similar to the one obtained by Fabra et al. (2006) with multi-step bids.
We run the simulation for the same α, Q¯, γ and δ parameters, and obtain a new data set with 321, 300
observations. Following the same procedure as in Section 5.2, we test the null hypothesis of linearity against the
alternative of structural breaks at the pivotal switching points αv. Evidence for the existence of a breaking point
can come either from signiﬁcant intercept change or slope change coeﬃcients, i.e. β1 and β3 diﬀerent from zero
in regression (6). The left-hand block of Table 4 summarises the Fama-MacBeth regression estimates. Consistent
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with the theoretical predictions, in all fourteen Q¯ cases, at least one of the two coeﬃcients is signiﬁcative at the .01
level, and there is only one non-signiﬁcative coeﬃcient at standard conﬁdence levels (slope coeﬃcient for Q¯ = 290).
These results suggest that the relationship between diversiﬁcation and prices not only appears when ﬁrms bid as
in vdF-H but also when peak-load ﬁrms submit more expressive supply functions.
<TABLE 4: ROBUSTNESS OF REGIME SWITCHING POINT ESTIMATES TO SUPPLY BIDDING AND cl=50>
However, are the simulation price levels diﬀerent if bidders are allowed to submit a supply function rather than
a singleton bid? Figures 9-11 report average prices and 95% conﬁdence intervals for this alternative bidding model
and Q¯ = 240, 180, 280, respectively, with γ = 0.005 and δ = 0.50. They are comparable to Figures 2-4. When
Q¯ = 240 and Q¯ = 280, prices are higher under supply bidding, and close to price cap, Ψ = 200. Particularly when
Q¯ = 280, diversiﬁcation has a small price eﬀect because closeness to Ψ dominates. However, when there is more
spare capacity, Q¯ = 180, the breaking point is more clear and prices are lower. Thus, supply function expressivity
seems to help ﬁrms compete when there is a lot of excess capacity and collude when this is tight.
<<FIGURES 9, 10, 11: PRICES UNDER SUPPLY FUNCTION BIDDING FOR Q¯ = {240, 180 and 280}>>
6.2 Positive base-load marginal costs
Another restriction of our implementation is that base-load costs are equal to zero. This is clearly a simpliﬁcation:
direct costs — such as fuel costs — are always diﬀerent from zero. In this section, we check the robustness of our results
to the assumption. To be conservative, we have chosen a relatively high base-load cost (cl = 50), corresponding to
one-half of the peak-load cost (ch = c = 100).
We run simulations for the α, Q¯, γ and δ parameters and obtain a new data set consisting of 321, 300 observations.
The right hand side block in Table 4 summarises the Fama-MacBeth estimates testing the existence of a breaking
point at αv for each Q¯ and the alternative cost value. In all fourteen Q¯ cases at least one of the two coeﬃcients is
signiﬁcative at the .01 level. The relationship between diversiﬁcation and prices also seems to appear when there
are positive base-load costs.
6.3 Demand elasticity
We have restricted our main implementation to have fully inelastic demand. The literature has established the
extremely low price-elasticity of short-term demand, originating among others from the lack of real-time metering
(e.g. Stoft, 2002). However, several electricity market features might eﬀectively reduce demand when prices rise.
Large industrial users might be able to turn on back-up generation assets if prices move beyond a certain threshold,
and even the residential demand elasticity might be larger than zero in some circumstances. Moreover, the existence
of forward contracts is economically similar to an increase in demand elasticity (Bushnell, 2007).
We examine the robustness of our results to a setting with some demand elasticity. We run simulations in a
linear market demand case (Pt = 2400 − 8Qt) implying these two bounds: P = 0 if and only if Q = 300 and
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P = 200 if and only if Q = 275. We run simulations for the usual α, γ and δ parameters, and obtain a data set
with 36, 720 observations. Figure 12 shows the average best-ﬁt regressions for all nine R-E parameter combinations,
which clearly present a breaking point around αˆ = 0.17. Interpolating, αˆ is equivalent to the breaking point one
would expect in the case of inelastic demand Q¯ = 275. Prices are also similar to the ones obtained for inelastic
demands of Q¯ = 270 and Q¯ = 280. The Fama-MacBeth estimates are statistically signiﬁcative.
<<FIGURE 12: AVERAGE BEST FIT REGRESSIONS WITH ELASTIC DEMAND>>
7 Conclusion
The main research question in this paper concerns the shape of the technology diversiﬁcation versus market price
relationship. Theoretical predictions suggest that the relationship is not monotonic but that it includes structural
breaks. The breaks are caused by changes in the number of pivotal plants. Computational simulations strongly
conﬁrm the importance of pivotal plants and correspond well with close-form results. Thus, our paper contributes
to clarifying the inﬂuence of production technologies with a characterisation of the role played by pivotal players.
We show that the composition of a ﬁrm’s technological portfolio is a market power instrument because it modiﬁes
pivotal dynamics and changes the intensity of competition. Low- and high-demand periods might not only lead to
more or less supply competition but also change its nature. In low-demand cases, there is a regime-switching point
of the diversiﬁcation level where the market moves from one to no pivotal plants. As a result, there is a sudden
loss of market power and prices drop. In high-demand cases, there is a regime-switching point where the market
setting changes from one to two pivotal players. Then, there is an increase in market power which facilitates some
implicit cooperation and prices increase.
The robustness tests suggest that more expressive bidding functions, positive costs and demand elasticity do
not qualitatively change these ﬁndings. The analysis, however, relies on a number of assumptions. First, they stem
from the R-E algorithm, which is only one of the models one could use. R-E reinforcement learning is shown to be a
fruitful alternative where standard theoretical methods turn out to be impractical. Moreover, where there are unique
theoretical predictions (e.g. switching points), R-E simulations match them well. However, alternative behavioural
models (e.g. Day and Bunn, 1999; García et al., 2005) and experiments can still further our understanding of real
markets. Second, the various simulation parameters — including number of ﬁrms, technology stocks, etc.— were
deﬁned as exogenous and independent of one another. It is possible that in reality they would be endogenously
determined, and complex simulations might contribute to study their reciprocal dynamics (e.g. Bunn and Oliveira,
2007).
Although our model is motivated by electricity market auctions, our results cannot be readily applied to real-
world electricity markets. They are derived from a highly stylised model, in which the degree of diversiﬁcation
determines the form of the bidding function. In the basic model the extent of each bidding segment depends on
the diversiﬁcation parameter. The supply bidding extension allows high-cost plants to submit increasing supply
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schedules. This accounts for how technological diversiﬁcation aﬀects the expressivity of supply functions but does
not separate the diversiﬁcation and functional form eﬀects. We view this as a promising avenue for further research.
One could also address the question of how the real-world functional bidding restrictions aﬀect bidding outcomes.
An extension in this direction might allow us to verify whether exogenous weather patterns might cause changes
in the ﬁrms’ trading behavior, which in turn contribute to the dramatic regime switching observed in electricity
prices (for example, Karakatsani and Bunn, 2004). Here, we have focused on a highly stylised, relatively standard
market model, whose outcomes are more directly comparable to those of close-form approaches.
Our ﬁndings can shed light on other homogeneous-good markets where ﬁrms use diﬀerent technologies and
compete in an auction framework. An example can be the transport of several commodities. For example, natural
gas can be transported in high-pressure pipelines or liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) tankers (see e.g. Jensen, 2003).
Pipelines present high ﬁxed but low variable costs. Hence, piped gas is often obtained regionally and used as base
load. In contrast, LNG cargoes are traded internationally at higher costs. Thus LNG gas involves higher variable
costs for shippers, who use it on top of piped gas in peak periods. Our ﬁndings suggest that the proportion of LNG
and piped capacities held by wholesalers could inﬂuence the market’s pivotal dynamics and be a determining price
factor.
Our results might also be relevant in the procurement of parcel delivery services (see Morlok et al., 2000).
U.S. carriers often use a mix of cheap ground and expensive air transportation in their overnight deliveries. Our
paper shows that a key determinant of the contract price for the provision of parcel delivery services might be the
proportion of ground and air capacity held by the competing bidders. This is particularly relevant since several
carriers have recently undergone a process of technological diversiﬁcation away from air freight and into ground
transportation. For example, FedEx launched FedEx Ground in 2000 and DHL acquired the ground operations of
Airbone in 2003.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
Following the structure of the Proposition we show parts (a), (b) and (c) in
turn. Finally, in part d, we derive one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for a
particular combination of the parameters.
Part (a) (no pivotal plants)
Take any equilibrium proﬁle, (bl1, bl2, bh1 , bh2). Suppose ﬁrst that bh1 > c is the
highest bid (Case 1). Suppose further that bl1 is the second-highest bid (Case
1.1). In this case, the price will be bl1, given that no single plant is pivotal and
that the capacities of the two plants add up to half of the market capacity. Since
the proﬁts are increasing in the price (quantity sold by Firm 1 will be the same),
we should have bh1 = Ψ and bl1 = Ψ − ε, with ε as close as possible to 0. For
this to be an equilibrium, it is necessary that Firm 20s bids are low enough to
ensure that Firm 1 does not have incentives to deviate. This type of equilibrium
will exist if, in the most aggressive bidding strategy possible of Firm 2 (bh2 = c,
bl2 < c), Firm 1 does not have an incentive to deviate to bh1 = c, bl1 < c. In this
deviation Firm 1 would be able to sell all its low-cost capacity, although market
prices would be lower. Firm 1 will not have an incentive to deviate if and only
if
Ψ
µ
Q¯− K
2
¶
≥ c(1− α)K
2
which is equivalent to
α ≥ α1(Q¯) ≡ 1−
Ψ
c
Q¯−K/2
K/2 .
Clearly, Firm 1 would have no incentive to exchange the bids between its plants
since it would then sell the same, albeit more with the high-cost plant and less
with the low-cost one. Firm 2 will never have an incentive to deviate since it is
selling all its capacity at the highest price. Notice that, if an equilibrium of this
type exist, there will be a set of them (with diﬀerent bids of Firm 2). They will
be payoﬀ-equivalent.
Now suppose that bh1 > c is the highest bid and bh2 is the second-highest bid
(Case 1.2). Since the high-cost capacity is equal to half of the total capacity,
then bh2 sets the price. If bh2 > c, then Firm 1 would have an incentive to deviate
to bh1 = bh2−ε since it would sell more at (roughly) the same price. And if bh2 = c
and this is the price then Firm 2 would have an incentive to marginally increase
its bid to sell the same at a higher price.
Now suppose that bh1 > c is the highest bid and bl2 is the second-highest bid
(Case 1.3). If bl2 > c Firm 1 would have incentives to set bh1 = bl2 − ε. If bl2 = c
then Firm 2 will increase bh2 because it is pivotal. If bl2 is not price setting then
Firm 2 will increase bh2 above bl2, producing the same in total but at a lower
cost.
Suppose now that bh2 is the highest bid (Case 2). Following the same reason-
ing as before, we have that bl2 = Ψ−ε, bh2 = Ψ and the only possible equilibrium
1
appears when the bids of Firm 1 are low enough. This is an equilibrium if and
only if
Ψ
µ
Q¯− K
2
¶
≥ cαK
2
.
which simplifying
α ≤ α2(Q¯) ≡
Ψ
c
Q¯−K/2
K/2 .
Notice that bl1 (and following the same reasoning bl2) cannot be the highest
bid. Since it is not pivotal, it is not price setting. If the high-cost plant of the
same ﬁrm is price setting, this ﬁrm would prefer to reallocate production to the
low-cost plant. If the price is set by any of the plants of the other ﬁrm, it would
lower the price to undercut them.
Now suppose that bh1 = bh2 = c and bl1 = bl2 = c. Here, the most proﬁtable
deviation by either ﬁrm consists in bidding Ψ − ε with the low-cost plant and
Ψ with the high-cost one. This is not proﬁtable for either ﬁrm if and only if
Ψ
µ
Q¯− K
2
¶
≤ cαk
2
≤ c(1− α)k
2
,
which simplifying
α > α2(Q¯) and α < α1(Q¯).
Finally, notice that if α > α2(Q¯) then we should have α < α1(Q¯). Suppose
that we have α ≤ 0.5 such that α > α2(Q¯) and α > α1(Q¯), which implies that
α > 1− α2(Q¯) and therefore α > {α2(Q¯), 1− α2(Q¯)}. This can only happen if
α > 0.5.
Part (b) (only high-cost plant 2 is pivotal)
Take again any equilibrium proﬁle, (bl1, bl2, bh1 , bh2). Suppose ﬁrst that bh2 ≥ c is
the highest bid. In this case, since this plant is pivotal, it sets the price. Given
that proﬁts are increasing in the price (the quantity sold by Firm 2 will be the
same), we should have bh2 = Ψ. For this to be an equilibrium, it is necessary that
Firm 10s bids are low enough to ensure that Firm 2 does not have incentives to
deviate. For example, bh2 = Ψ, bl2 < Ψ, bl1 = 0 and bh1 = c is an equilibrium given
that Firm 1 would not have any incentive to deviate (it is selling all its capacity
at the highest price) and Firm 2 can only sell more by bidding bh2 = c and bl2 < c
(the additional units, though, would be sold at marginal cost). Notice, however,
that there are many equilibria, all of them payoﬀ-equivalent.
Now suppose that bh1 is the highest bid. Following the same reasoning as
in the previous case (part a), we have that any equilibrium of this type should
satisfy bh1 = Ψ and bl1 = Ψ − ε and bh2 and bl2 being low enough. This is an
equilibrium if and only if α ≥ α1(Q¯). Following also the same reasoning as
before, bl2 cannot be the highest bid. Finally, bl1 cannot be the highest bid
either. In that case, this plant would be setting the price, which should be
bl1 = Ψ. But, then the payoﬀ obtained by Firm 1 would be equivalent to the one
2
obtained if bh1 = Ψ− ε. Then it would be proﬁtable to interchange the bids of
their plants,
¡
bl1
¢0
= Ψ− ε and
¡
bh1
¢0
= Ψ because the price would be the same
and more production will be reallocated to the lower-cost plant.
Part (c) (both high-cost plants are pivotal)
First, and following the same reasoning as in the ﬁrst type of equilibrium above,
we have that bh2 = Ψ, bl2 < Ψ and bl1 and bh1 low enough are a set of equilibria.
Again, they are payoﬀ-equivalent. We should also have that bh1 = Ψ, bl1 < Ψ and
bl2 and bh2 low enough are another set of equilibria, all payoﬀ-equivalent because
the high-cost plant of Firm 2 is pivotal. Third, we cannot have that bl1 is the
highest bid. Indeed, in that case, it would be proﬁtable for Firm 1 to interchange
the bids of their plants. The price in the hypothesised equilibrium and in the
potential deviation would be the same (equal to bl1). But in the deviation the
ﬁrm would be selling more quantity with the low-cost plant, and therefore proﬁts
should be higher. Finally, and following again the same reasoning, bl2 cannot be
the highest bid.
A class of mixed strategy Nash equilibria
Take the case where α = 0.5, which implies that both ﬁrms are perfectly diversi-
ﬁed and symmetric, and Q¯ > 3K/4, which implies that both high-cost plants are
pivotal. In what follows we are going to show that both low-cost plants bidding
below c and both high-cost plants choosing a particular probability distribution
over all the possible bids is a mixed strategy equilibrium.
First, none of the low-cost plants would have an incentive to give positive
probability to (pure) bids above c. As in the case of pure strategy equilibria,
if the low-cost ﬁrm sets the price, ﬁrms could have earned more by setting the
price with their high-cost plant. From now on, therefore, we concentrate on the
strategies of the high-cost ﬁrms.
Second, given that in our candidate equilibrium high-cost plants give a posi-
tive probability to all possible (pure) bids, it is necessary and suﬃcient to show
that all (pure) bids have the same expected payoﬀ. Thus, by symmetry, we can
ﬁnd the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium by solving a system of equations. The
system is formed by all the payoﬀ equivalences and an equation which ensures
that the probabilities add up to 1.
The number of equations and unknowns of the system is given by the num-
ber of pure strategy bids available, i.e. it depends on the discretisation of the
continuous space. Let us start with the most coarse discretisation, i.e. a dis-
cretisation where only two bids, c and Ψ, are available. Suppose that a given
ﬁrm bids c with probability p, where 0 < p < 1, and Ψ with probability 1−p. A
mixed strategy (p∗, 1− p∗) is part of Nash equilibrium if it makes the other ﬁrm
indiﬀerent to playing c or Ψ. Straightforward algebra shows that the unique p∗
that solves this equation is given by
p∗ = K − Q¯Q¯ .
3
Let us now make the discretisation ﬁner. Suppose that three equally-spaced
bids are available, c, (Ψ − c)/2, Ψ. Following a similar procedure as above, a
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium is given by (p∗1, p∗2, 1− p∗1 − p∗2), where
p∗1 =
2(K − Q¯)2
(K − Q¯)2 + Q¯2 and p
∗
2 =
2(2Q¯−K)(K − Q¯)
(K − Q¯)2 + Q¯2 .
This process can be iterated for ﬁner discretisations. As we make the dis-
cretisation ﬁner, i.e. we increase the number of pure strategy bids available, the
system becomes more diﬃcult to solve. For ﬁne discretisations, the system can
only be solved numerically.
Interestingly, for any discretisation, the probability density is increasing, i.e.
higher (less competitive) bids have higher probability. For example, it is easy
to show that, given that Q¯ > 3K/4, p∗ < 1 − p∗ and p∗1 < p∗2 < 1 − p∗1 − p∗2.
Further, as the demand increases, the probability given to the highest bid is
higher, i.e. the derivative of 1− p∗ and 1− p∗1 − p∗2 are increasing in Q¯. At the
same time, the probability given to the lowest bid is lower, i.e. the derivative of
p∗ and p∗1 are decreasing in Q¯.
4
